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ABSTRACT
Understanding web co-location is essential for various reasons.
For instance, it can help one to assess the collateral damage that
denial-of-service attacks or IP-based blocking can cause to the
availability of co-located web sites. However, it has been more than
a decade since the first study was conducted in 2007. The Internet
infrastructure has changed drastically since then, necessitating a
renewed study to comprehend the nature of web co-location.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical study to revisit web co-
location using datasets collected from active DNS measurements.
Our results show that the web is still small and centralized to a
handful of hosting providers. More specifically, we find that more
than 60% of web sites are co-located with at least ten other web
sites—a group comprising less popular web sites. In contrast, 17.5%
of mostly popular web sites are served from their own servers.
Although a high degree of web co-location could make co-hosted
sites vulnerable to DoS attacks, our findings show that it is an in-
creasing trend to co-host many web sites and serve them from well-
provisioned content delivery networks (CDN) of major providers
that provide advanced DoS protection benefits. Regardless of the
high degree of web co-location, our analyses of popular block lists
indicate that IP-based blocking does not cause severe collateral
damage as previously thought.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks→ Network measurement;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, the World Wide Web (the web for
brevity) has grown exponentially, thanks to the rapid expansion
of the Internet. A web site is a fundamental unit that makes up
the web, in which related web resources (e.g., web pages, images,
audios, and videos) are gathered and published via a web server
identified by a domain name (e.g., example.com). Prior to 1997, each
web site was typically hosted on its own server with a distinct IP
address. Therefore, the number of unique IP addresses, with the
standard web port (i.e., 80) open, was an accurate proxy to estimate
the number of web sites at the time. However, since the introduction
of name-based virtual hosting technology as a part of HTTP/1.1 in
1997 [12], many web sites can be co-hosted on the same IP address,
making it more challenging and sophisticated to measure the web,
especially in terms of web co-location [25].
∗Co-first authors
Understanding web site co-location is essential for various rea-
sons. For instance, it can help one to assess the collateral damage
that denial-of-service (DoS) attacks or IP-based blocking can cause
to the availability of co-located web sites. Shue et al. [37] conducted
the first study of web co-location more than a decade ago and found
that the web was smaller than it seemed in terms of the location of
servers. The study quantifies i) the extent to which the availabil-
ity of the web can be affected by targeted DoS attacks, and ii) the
impact of several IP block lists on co-hosted web sites. Since then,
the Internet has grown dramatically. More than 354 million domain
names have been registered across all top-level domains (TLDs)
as of the second quarter of 2019 [41]. In addition, the adoption
of IPv6 and CDNs have changed the way web traffic is delivered.
Considering these drastic changes of the Internet infrastructure
over the last decade, it is desirable to investigate whether previous
findings by Shue et al. [37] still hold in today’s web ecosystem.
In this paper, we revisit the study of web site co-location by
analyzing datasets collected from active DNS measurements. Com-
paring our results with those of Shue et al. [37], we find that the
web is still small and centralized to a handful of hosting providers.
Some IP addresses of major hosting providers host from hundreds
of thousands to millions of web sites, which is an increasing trend
as these providers often provide web sites hosted on their infras-
tructure with not only low-cost DoS protection benefits, but also
access to their well-provisioned CDN. Regardless of the high de-
gree of web co-location, different from previous observations, our
analyses of popular IP block lists show that their collateral damage
is relatively small. Since these block lists are carefully curated by
reputable organizations, a vast majority of blacklisted IP addresses
are associated with only one blocked domain.
2 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we review existing DNS measurement methods and
discuss the objectives of our experiment. We also describe how our
domain dataset was collected.
2.1 Existing DNS Measurement Techniques
Using passive measurement, DNS data is obtained by an entity who
is in a position to capture DNS traffic from the network infrastruc-
ture under its control (e.g., networks of academic institutes or small
organizations) [43]. Several previous studies use passive measure-
ment to observe DNS traffic [5, 8, 20, 37, 43]. Passive measurements,
however, may introduce bias in the data collected depending on
the time, location, and demographics of users within the monitored
network. Moreover, another issue with passive data collection is
ethics, as data gathered over a long period of time can reveal online
habits of monitored users.
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In contrast, active measurement involves sending and receiving
DNS queries and responses. Researchers can choose which domains
to resolve depending on the goals of their study, thus having more
control over the collected data. Although this approach can remedy
the privacy issue of passive DNS measurement, it requires an in-
creased amount of resources for running a dedicated measurement
infrastructure if there is a large number of domains that need to
be resolved [20]. There are prior works that have been conducting
large-scale active DNS measurements for different purposes and
provide their datasets to the community [20, 33].
However, these datasets have some specificmeasurement choices
that make them unsuitable to be used directly for the purpose of
our study. First, all DNS resolutions are issued from a single loca-
tion (country), while we desire to observe all potential localized IP
addresses due to the deployment of CDNs in different regions. More-
over, these datasets aim to exhaustively resolve as many domain
names as possible regardless of whether or not they are actively
hosting any web content. We further discuss these differences in §4.
2.2 Measurement Objectives
Although it is desirable for us to resolve all web sites to their IP
address(es), it is incredibly challenging or even unrealistic to resolve
all of them with sufficient regularity (e.g., on a daily basis). As our
goal is to study the nature of web co-location and its impact on
web users, it is reasonable to focus on active sites that are often
visited by the majority of users. To curate such a subset of web sites,
we utilized the Alexa and Majestic lists of site rankings. However,
only considering the most popular web sites would bias our results.
Instead, we tried to include as many sites as possible while keeping
our measurements manageable and at the same time, observing a
representative subset of web sites on the Internet.
Due to the increasing adoption of load balancing technologies
and CDNs, exhaustively resolving all possible IP addresses for a
given domain can be challenging. To approximate this domain-to-IP
mapping, we conducted active DNS measurements from several
vantage points obtained from providers of Virtual Private Servers
(VPS). We tried to select our measurement locations in a fashion
that they are geographically distributed around the globe, thus
allowing us to capture as many localized IP addresses of CDN-
hosted domains as possible. To that end, we choose nine locations
for our measurements, including Brazil, Germany, India, Japan,
New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States, and South
Africa. Our vantage points span the six most populous continents.
2.3 Domain Name Datasets
In the original study, Shue et al. [37] conducted analyses on two
datasets of domain names collected from i) the DMOZ Open Direc-
tory Project∗ and ii) the zone files of .com and .net TLDs. Although
it would be ideal to reproduce the study using similar datasets, the
DMOZ project was closed in 2017. On the other hand, the number
of domains registered under the .com and .net TLDs has doubled to
156.1M from 75.7M at the time of the original study in 2007.
Pochat et al. [23] recently propose Tranco, which is a list of pop-
ular domains combined from data of the most recent 30 days of four
∗The authors modify the DMOZ dataset to exclude web sites whose domains are in
the .com and .net zone files.
Table 1: Daily breakdown of domains and IP addresses ob-
served from each dataset.
VPS Data ActiveDNS Rapid7
Unique domains 8.6M 242M 2B
IPv4-hosted FQDNs 8.2M 117M 1.2B
Unique IPv4s 2.1M 11.5M 710M
IPv6-hosted FQDNs 1.2M 230K 48M
Unique IPv6s 280K 74K 8.8M
top lists that are widely used by the research community: Alexa [2],
Majestic [27], Umbrella [40], and Quantcast [31]. However, each
top list has its own pitfalls that may negatively impact analysis
results if used without careful considerations [23, 35, 36].
To that end, we curated our own domain name dataset from the
most recent 30 days of the Alexa and Majestic lists for two reasons.
First, these two lists use ranking techniques that are harder and
expensive to manipulate [23]. Second, they also have the highest
number of common domain names among the four. We do not
directly use the Tranco list since it includes domain names from
Quantcast and Umbrella. Particularly, Quantcast mostly contains
sites that are popular only in the US [23]. Umbrella is highly vulner-
able to DNS-based manipulation [23], while it also contains many
domains that do not serve web content [35].
From each of our VPS locations, we sent iterative A and AAAA
queries for 8.6M fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) on a daily
basis. By sending iterative queries, wemake sure that local resolvers
are not answering these queries from their cache, but the answers
come from the actual authoritative name servers. We conducted
our measurement for two weeks from July 26th to August 8th, 2019.
Our dataset is available at https://bit.ly/web-colocation-ccr20.
For comparison, we also repeat our analysis on two public datasets
collected during the same period provided by the Active DNS
Project [20] and Rapid7 [33] in §4. The Active DNS project queries
about 242M domains extracted from zone files of approximately
1.3K TLDs on a daily basis. Rapid7’s dataset consists of a much
larger number of domains (2B) obtained from zone files, web crawl-
ing, and domains returned from PTR records by querying reverse
DNS lookup of the whole IPv4 space.
Table 1 summarizes our preliminary observation of unique do-
mains and IP addresses observed in each dataset. Overall, the num-
bers of domains are much larger than the numbers of IP addresses,
indicating that numerous domains are co-hosted under the same IP
address(es). We further analyze this co-location degree in §3 and §4.
3 WEB CO-LOCATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze our dataset collected via active DNS mea-
surement to investigate the extent to which web sites are co-located
in terms of IP addresses and autonomous systems (AS).We also com-
pare our findings with those found by Shue et al. [37] to examine if
previous observations still apply in today’s web ecosystem.
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Figure 1: CDF of domains per IP as a percentage of IPv4/IPv6
addresses observed in our dataset.
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Figure 2: CDF of domains per IP as a percentage of domains
hosted on IPv4/IPv6 addresses observed in our dataset.
3.1 Web Server Co-location
The co-location degree can be defined in two ways depending on
whether we consider an IP address or a domain. When an IP address
is considered, the co-location degree is the number of domains
hosted on that IP address. Computing the co-location degree of a
given domain, however, is more complex as a domain can be hosted
on several IP addresses. Therefore, we calculate the co-location
degree of a domain by taking the median of co-location degrees
across all IP addresses that host that domain.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
co-location degree per IP as a percentage of IPv4/IPv6 addresses
observed in our dataset. A large portion of both IPv4 (70.5%) and
IPv6 (61.7%) are associated with only one domain name. Our find-
ings are similar to those of Shue et al. [37], in which 71% of the IPv4
addresses in their DMOZ dataset host only one domain.
Figure 1 may give an impression that many domains are hosted
on their own IP address since there aremany IP addresses associated
with only one domain. However, according to Figure 2, there are
only 17.5% and 8.3% of domains are hosted on their own IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses, respectively, without sharing the hosting server
with any other domain. This number was higher (24%) in [37] when
considering domains obtained from the DMOZ dataset.
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Figure 3: CDF of domains per AS observed in our dataset.
Figure 2 also indicates that about 65% of the web sites in our
dataset are co-hosted with 100 or fewer web sites, decreasing from
84% in the study of Shue et al. [37]. On the contrary, we observe that
20% of domains are co-hosted with more than 1K other domains on
an IPv4 address, increasing from 6% from the previous study [37].
Our findings show that more domains are co-hosted nowadays.
The other end of the CDF in both Figures 1 and 2 denote a
small number of IP addresses having an extremely high degree
of co-location, hosting a larger number of domains. The highest
co-location degrees are 382K domains for an IPv4 address, and 167K
domains for an IPv6 address. Conducting further investigation, we
find that the IP address with the highest co-location degree in our
dataset belongs to Google, hosting a large number of blogspot sites
(i.e., sub-sites of blogger.com).
3.2 Hosting Provider Co-location
Next, we use CAIDA’s pfx2as dataset [6] to map IP addresses to
their organization (i.e., ASN). Similar to the co-location degree of
an IP address (§3.1), the co-location degree in this section is defined
as the number of domain names hosted on the same AS.
Figure 3 shows the CDF of domains per AS as a percentage of
ASes and domains. 28% of ASes host only one domain while only
0.1% of domains are hosted on an AS themselves. Shue et al. [37]
found that there were 60% of domains co-hosted with more than 1K
other domains in the same AS. This number has increased to almost
90% of domains as indicated in Figure 3. These findings again show
that an even larger number of domains are co-located in terms of
their hosting provider, indicating that the web is still small since
the first study of Shue et al. conducted more than a decade ago [37].
We further analyze our dataset to investigate which organiza-
tions dominate most of the IP addresses and domains. Table 2 shows
the top-ten ASes that i) occupy the largest portion of IP addresses,
and ii) host the highest number of web sites. As expected, popu-
lar CDN providers (e.g., Amazon, Cloudflare, and DigitalOcean)
are among the providers from which most IP addresses were ob-
served. However, in terms of the number of domains, Cloudflare
and Google are the two largest providers, hosting more than 700K
domains each. As Cloudflare provides free web caching services, it
is expected to attract many web owners to proxy their web traffic
through Cloudflare’s CDN. While Google is not among the top-ten
ASes that dominate the most IP addresses observed, the company
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Table 2: Top hosting providers that have the highest number
of IP addresses/domains.
Organization IPv4s
AS16509 Amazon 130K
AS13335 Cloudflare 107K
AS14061 DigitalOcean 86K
AS16276 OVH 76K
AS46606 Unified Layer 62K
AS24940 HETZNER-AS 58K
AS14618 Amazon 57K
AS26496 GoDaddy 51K
AS37963 Alibaba 33K
AS63949 Linode 31K
Organization Domains
AS13335 Cloudflare 769K
AS15169 Google 701K
AS26496 GoDaddy 382K
AS46606 Unified Layer 278K
AS16276 OVH 267K
AS16509 Amazon 236K
AS24940 HETZNER-AS 229K
AS2635 Automattic 145K
AS14061 DigitalOcean 130K
AS14618 Amazon 129K
tends to cluster a large number of web sites under a handful of IP
addresses, as shown in §3.1. Although a high co-location degree
could make co-hosted sites vulnerable to DoS attacks, our finding
shows an increasing trend in which more and more web sites are
co-hosted and served from well-provisioned CDN of major hosting
providers (e.g., Cloudflare, Google). These providers often offer
advanced DoS protection benefits at a relatively low cost [7, 16]. A
higher co-location degree can also potentially improve the privacy
gain of new domain name encryption protocols [19].
Many popular web sites are often served from different IP ad-
dresses which may belong to different ASes. We curate our dataset
from top lists of popular web sites, and thus are interested in ex-
amining whether these web sites are solely hosted on one AS or
mirrored on several ASes. More specifically, we examine the top-
five populous ASes hosting more than 250K domains, to see if the
domains hosted by them are also hosted on other ASes. If a domain
is hosted on more than one AS, we call it a “multi-origin” domain.
Although Figure 4 shows some multi-origin web sites that are
hosted on more than one AS, the number of such web sites is
relatively small. More than 99.9% of domains in each AS are only
hosted on that AS themselves. This result again confirms that a
vast majority of web sites are centralized in a handful of hosting
providers. Most web sites are hosted solely on one AS without being
mirrored on other ASes. Although most major hosting providers
are equipped with enhanced DoS protections, this single-hosting
choice may have some impact on the availability of web sites hosted
on smaller hosting providers when it comes to targeted DoS attacks.
4 CO-LOCATION DEGREE IN COMPARISON
WITH LARGER DNS DATASETS
Next, we repeat our analysis conducted in §3 using two larger DNS
datasets to examine the extent to which servers are co-located
when considering a much larger number of domain names. More
specifically, we analyze the datasets collected by the Active DNS
Project [20] and Rapid7 [33] to compare the co-location degree
presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3 with these two datasets.
4.1 Dataset Differences
As mentioned in §2, although the two datasets are similar to our
dataset in terms of measurement methodology (i.e., active measure-
ment), the location of DNS resolution and the set of resolved domain
768,461 154 231 77 77 769,000
140 697,004 3,715 70 70 701,000
229 3,692 378,027 76 38 382,000
83 83 55 277,749 27 278,000
53 80 53 26 266,786 267,000
AS1335 AS15169 AS26496 AS46606 AS16276 Total
AS16276
AS46606
AS26496
AS15169
AS1335
Figure 4: Number of multi-origin domains among top-five
autonomous systems. Each cell indicates the number of com-
mon domains between two ASes.
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Figure 5: CDF of domains per IP as a percentage of IPv4/IPv6
addresses observed in Active DNS and Rapid7 datasets.
names are the two reasons making these datasets unsuitable to be
used directly for the purpose of our study.
With regard to the resolution location, both datasets are collected
only from the US. Particularly, the Active DNS dataset is collected
at Georgia Tech while the Rapid7 dataset is collected from AWS EC2
nodes in the US. This measurement choice thus could have missed
some localized IP addresses of CDN-hosted domains, which we try
to obtain by resolving from multiple locations in our experiment.
In terms of the number of resolved domain names, both datasets
resolve an order of magnitude larger number of domains than ours
as shown in Table 1. Most of these domains, however, are not repre-
sentative of web sites, while many of themmay correspond to spam,
phishing [29, 32, 39], malware command and control servers [3], or
parking pages registered during the domain drop-catching proce-
dure [4, 22], which most web users would not typically visit. This
is the primary reason why we opt to curate our own set of domains
from the lists of popular web sites on the Internet.
4.2 Comparison of Co-location Degree
Figure 5 shows the CDF of the co-location degree per IP as a per-
centage of all IPv4/IPv6 addresses observed in each dataset. Similar
to our observation in Figure 1, a large number of both IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses are associated with only one domain name. More
specifically, 61% of IPv4 addresses in the Active DNS dataset host
only one domain, while this number is 93% in the Rapid7 dataset.
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Figure 6: CDF of domains per IP as a percentage of domains
hosted on IPv4/IPv6 addresses observed in Active DNS and
Rapid7 datasets.
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Figure 7: CDF of domains per AS observed inActive DNS and
Rapid7 datasets.
This result shows a slight decrease from 69% of IPv4 addresses that
host only one domain observed in the study of Shue et al. [37] when
considering domains obtained from the .com and .net zone files.
Similar to our observation in Figure 2, the percentage of domains
hosted on an IP themselves is relatively small as shown in Figure 6.
The right end of the CDF denotes domains with an extremely high
degree of co-location. The highest co-location degrees of Active
DNS and Rapid7 are 3.1M and 73.3M per IP address, respectively.
Conducting further investigation, we find that the IP address
with the highest co-location degree in Active DNS dataset belongs to
Google Cloud and servesmore than threemillion personal and small
business domains. For Rapid7, the IP address having the highest co-
location degree belongs to AS16276 OVH SAS and hosts more than
73 million mail servers, instead of web content. Understandably, a
significant portion of domain names used in Rapid7 dataset consists
of PTR records obtained by performing reverse DNS queries over
the whole IPv4 address space. Although most reverse DNS lookups
do not return a meaningful domain name [19], an IP address hosting
an email server is required to have a PTR record, storing the domain
name of that email server due to Anti-Spam Recommendations of
the Internet Engineering Task Force [24].
Table 3: IP addresses in each block list and common IP ad-
dresses between each list and the three DNS datasets.
Block lists Unique IPs VPS Data ActiveDNS Rapid7
Level1 624,564,857 3,587 34,134 145,540
Level2 35,371 816 1,936 8,175
Level3 37,743 571 1,730 9,747
Level4 9,401,369 21,224 59,948 468,026
Ads 13,422 595 1,895 3,594
Regardless of resolving a much larger number of domain names,
Figure 7 shows that only 11.7% of ASes in the Active DNS dataset
and 3.7% of ASes in the Rapid7 dataset host one domain, while more
than 95% of domains in both datasets are co-hosted on the same AS
with at least 10K other domains, showing an extremely high level
of AS co-location.
5 BLOCKING COLLATERAL DAMAGE
In this section, we utilize two additional datasets to quantify the
collateral damage on co-located domains of IP-based block lists and
censorship-motivated block lists.
5.1 IP-based blocking collateral damage
In the context of IP-based network filtering, the availability of a
web site can be severely impacted by its co-location degree with
other sites. For instance, if a powerful DoS attack targets a web site,
other co-located sites may also become inaccessible depending on
how well-provisioned the hosting infrastructure is. In the initial
study by Shue et al. [37], to estimate the collateral damage caused
by IP-based blocking, the authors use IP block lists provided by a
security company, which unfortunately no longer exists.
For our study, we obtained an additional dataset from Fire-
HOL [15], which is an open-source firewall software that curates
its block lists from several highly reputable sources (e.g., Abuse.ch,
DShield.org, and Spamhaus.org). Of its block lists, FireHOL aggre-
gates several external well-known lists to create four IP block lists,
ranked from 1 to 4, of which level1 list has minimum false positives,
and level4 may include a large number of false positives.
More specifically, level1 is curated to include well-known adver-
sarial IP addressesmonitored by Spamhaus.org and Team-Cymru.org.
Level2 includes IP addresses detected to recently conduct brute force
attacks. Level3 contains malicious IP ranges reported by several
trustworthy sources in the last 30 days. Finally, Level4 is made from
block lists that track various type of attacks but is susceptible to
false positives. In addition, we also utilize FireHOL’s lists that con-
tain IP addresses of advertising services and trackers. Table 3 shows
the number of IP addresses that each block list has and the number
of common IP addresses found in the three DNS datasets used in
our study. Of these block lists, Level1 and Level4 have the largest
numbers of blacklisted IP addresses.
We tested the FireHOL lists, obtained on July 26th, 2019, against
the three DNS datasets to estimate the number of domains affected.
Figure 8 depicts the CDF of domains affected per blacklisted IP
address. Across all three DNS datasets, almost 50% of blacklisted
IP addresses host only one domain. As expected, Level1 has the
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Figure 8: CDF of blocked domains per blacklisted IP address as a percentage of common IP addresses between the five block
lists and the three DNS datasets.
highest percentage of blacklisted IP addresses that host only one
domain, thus causing the least collateral damage. Level1 is indeed
trusted and widely used by the FireHOL community because the list
is carefully compiled from well-known sources to minimize false
positives. Although level4 allegedly might include false positives,
concerning a high level of collateral damage, its percentage of black-
listed IP addresses hosting only one domain is the second-highest
(after Level1). Overall, less than 10% of blacklisted IP addresses of
these block lists host more than 100 domains. Unlike previous ob-
servations, this result shows that state-of-the-art IP block lists are
getting better and only cause minimal collateral damage.
5.2 Censorship collateral damage
While domain-name-based blocking is one of the dominant tech-
niques that is often used by censors [1, 9, 11, 17, 30, 38, 42], IP-based
blocking can also be very effective for censorship [10, 18, 44]. Cur-
rently, domain name information is exposed in either DNS queries
or the server name indication (SNI) extension to TLS. This infor-
mation poses many privacy risks to web users while making it
easier for censors to conduct censorship based on the domain name.
To remedy these problems, new technologies, including DNS over
HTTPS/TLS and ESNI, are introduced to encrypt the domain name
information. Under such a circumstance, censors may shift to IP-
based blocking if the domain name information cannot be obtained.
To quantify the collateral damage of IP-based censorship, we
obtained a list of sensitive sites that are likely to be censored in
many countries around the globe. The list is curated by the Citizen
Lab [21] and widely used in censorship measurement studies [14,
28]. The list consists of 1,257 web sites, of which we could find
957, 887, and 932 common sites in our dataset, Active DNS, and
Rapid7, respectively. We map these domains to their IP address(es)
and investigate how many co-located domains would be impacted
if a censor conducts IP-based filtering to block these domains.
As indicated in Figure 9, nearly 90% of censored IP addresses host
only one sensitive domain, while the highest numbers of affected
domains are 11, 6, and 18 for our dataset, Active DNS, and Rapid7,
respectively. The result indicates that IP-based censorship will cause
little to no collateral damage. To investigate the reason for this
finding, we map 2.8K potentially censored IP addresses to their ASN
and find 410 unique hosting providers. Of these providers, 280 ASes
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Figure 9: CDF of affected domains per censored IP address
as a percentage of all observed IP addresses from censored
domains in the Citizen Lab global sensitive list.
(68%) host only one domain while 393 ASes (96%) host no more than
ten sensitive domains from the Citizen Lab domain list. Therefore,
the minimal collateral damage found above is potentially due to
the selection of hosting provider used by censored domains. On the
other hand, previous actions from the side of providers to hinder
domain fronting [13, 34] have shown that the collateral damage [26]
caused to hosting providers may have made them unwilling to co-
host censored domains with other innocuous domains.
6 CONCLUSION
Since its invention, the web has expanded beyond our imagination.
More than a decade ago, Shue et al. [37] conducted the first study of
web co-location and found that the web was smaller than it seemed.
In this paper, we conduct a revisit study of web co-location and
could confirm that the web is indeed still small. More specifically,
we find that a large number of web sites (often less well-known) are
co-hosted on a few IP addresses that belong to major CDN provider.
In contrast, a small group of more popular web sites are served
from their own well-provisioned servers, occupying a larger pool
of IP addresses. While this finding of web co-location is similar
to its of Shue et al., our analyses on IP-based blocking show that
state-of-the-art IP block lists are getting better, thus causing a very
minimal amount of collateral damage.
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